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Arnold J. Toynbee and Islamism  
in Cold War – Era Turkey
Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç
Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran 
S tudies on the formation of modern Islamist thought in Turkey often provide a long- term perspec-tive, linking the Islamist political orientations with Pan- Islamist thought of the late Ottoman era. This continuity thesis, however, neglects the crucial transformations in Islamism in the post – World 
War II period, when the international politics of Cold War and decolonization struggles coincided with 
the boom of Islamist intellectual writings in secular Republican Turkey. This article concentrates on 
the crucial additions to and reinterpretations of Islamist thought in Turkey during the Cold War and 
post – Cold War period by focusing on the civilizationist worldview of Sezai Karakoç (1933 – ), whose influ-
ential writings on the civilizational resurrection (diriliş) of Islam have not received the scholarly attention 
they deserve. By deconstructing Karakoç’s ideas on civilizational Islam and putting them in relation to 
the writings and influence of British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1889 – 1975), this article attempts to 
achieve several objectives: first, it tries to establish the connections between global intellectual history and 
Islamist thought in Cold War Turkey. Second, it traces the long- term impact of the civilizational theory 
of world history and politics during the Cold War period on the relations of contemporary Turkey with 
Europe as well as the Muslim- majority countries in the region. Finally, it aims to explain the resurfacing 
and popularity of civilizational theses promoted by post – Cold War theorists, be it in terms of “dialogue” 
or “clashes” among multiple civilizations.
Karakoç was born in the year of 1933, in the Eastern Anatolian town Ergani, at the peak of the 
Westernist cultural revolutions implemented by the Kemalist elite in Turkey. He was raised during the 
one- party authoritarian secularist rule of the Republican People’s Party in Turkey, when school children 
in Anatolia were taught the virtues of Western civilization, modernization, and Turkish nationalism. At 
the same time, as a student without financial means, Karakoç benefited from the free public education 
of the young republic, completing almost all of his education on government scholarship, including his 
university training in the prestigious Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University. Upon graduation 
from university in 1955, Karakoç worked for the Turkish Ministry of Finance in various capacities, partly 
to fulfill the compulsory public service condition of his government scholarship. Since his resignation 
from public service in 1973, Karakoç has been earning his living from the sale of his publications on po-
litical and cultural issues, as well as his poetry book.
E M P I R E  t o  R E P U B L I C
1. For more information on Karakoç’s poetry, 
see Karataş, Doğu’nun Yedinci Oğlu, 211 – 19.
2. TRT Sezai Karakoç Belgeseli (the Turkish Radio 
Television Corporation documentary on Sezai 
Karakoç) was first broadcast on September 10, 
2010. It was titled “Gün Doğmadan” (“Before 
the Dawn”) in reference to a poem by Karakoç.
3. Similarly, Sezai Karakoç earlier declined to 
appear in the ceremony when he was the re-
cipient of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism Grand Award in 2007.
4. See “President Gül Giving an Award to this 
Intellectual Mentor” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’den 
‘fikir hocasına’ ödül”), Sabah, December 27, 
2011, www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/12/27 
/cumhurbaskani- gulden- fikir- hocasina- odul.
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The period of Sezai Karakoç’s youth coin-
cided with the destruction of Europe in WWII, 
the emergence of Cold War global politics, and 
the postwar period of decolonization in Muslim- 
majority countries all over Asia and Africa. Kara-
koç started to express his political ideas in the 
1950s, during the first multiparty political experi-
ment of democratization in Turkey. In this Cold 
War context, Karakoç was deeply interested in 
independence struggles in Tunis and Algeria as 
well as the question of Palestine. Meanwhile, other 
Islamist writers like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and 
Nurettin Topçu, who were older than Karakoç and 
influenced him, were trying to redefine secular 
Turkish nationalism by identifying it with Islam 
on the intellectual level. By merging nationalism 
and Muslim faith, they were able to express Is-
lamist ideas to criticize the secularism of Kemalist 
reforms. However, the close relationship that was 
established by these intellectuals between Islam 
and nationalism was reshaped by Karakoç in a 
more internationalist and civilizationist manner, 
employing Toynbee’s broader framework of world 
history. Thus, Karakoç became a representative 
figure in re- internationalizing Islamism in Turkey 
and connecting it with a new postcolonial third- 
wordlist political vision through the language of 
civilizationism.
Karakoç remained a kind of mystic intellec-
tual, preferring to stay outside the mainstream 
organizations, parties, and movements. Thus, he 
cannot be considered an ideologue of any of the 
influential mass conservative democratic parties 
such as the Justice and Development Party ( JDP). 
Yet, his critiques of Western civilization and his vi-
sion of a Muslim civilizational revival exerted sig-
nificant influence on several generations of con-
servative intellectuals of Turkey, and they allow 
us to better understand the content and nature 
of Islamist political orientation in contemporary 
Turkey. Karakoç is known as a very talented poet, 
composing one of the most celebrated love poems, 
titled “Mona Rosa,” in modern Turkish literature.1 
More important, as a bookish intellectual and an 
avid follower of world trends, he wrote important 
essays on the politics of civilizational identities and 
his vision of Islamic civilization’s revival that are 
influential today. When he was selected for the lit-
erature award by the Turkish Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism in 2007, the documentary prepared 
in his honor by the Turkish Television and Radio 
Company featured testimonies from leading poli-
ticians and intellectuals in Turkey. At the age of 
eighty- two, he still attracts visits and praises by 
leading politicians, even though he remains criti-
cal of foreign and domestic policies in Turkey.2
Karakoç’s current ascetic life did not prevent 
him from shaping the Islamist thought of two gen-
erations from the 1960s to the 1990s. When he was 
awarded Turkey’s presidential award for services 
to Turkish literature in 2011, Karakoç declined to 
appear in the ceremony in his honor at the presi-
dential palace.3 Yet, when the presidential award 
was announced, Turkish newspapers noted that 
President Abdullah Gül himself was an avid reader 
of Karakoç’s poetry and essays during his youth.4 
His vision of the civilizational revival of Islam be-
came embraced by many politicians and ideolo-
gies of Turkish conservative Democrats. Part of 
Karakoç’s appeal and reputation comes from his 
detachment from power centers and his humble 
lifestyle. Yet, the main reason for his influence is 
the appeal of his civilizational framework for in-
terpreting history, religious issues, and the politics 
of educated publics in Turkey and beyond. There-
fore, Karakoç’s civilizationist worldview should be 
examined in order to better understand the global 
intellectual history and political implications of 
the discourse of civilization in relation to the Cold 
War, decolonization struggles, Westernization pro-
cesses in Muslim societies, and the post – Cold War 
era rise of political Islam. Karakoç was an active 
witness to all of these processes and contributed to 
the general Muslim intellectual response to them. 
5. For good biographies of Arnold Toynbee, see 
McNeill, Arnold Toynbee: A Life, and Perry, Ar-
nold Toynbee and the Crisis of the West. The 
following brief biography relies mainly on Mc-
Neill’s monograph.
6. Toynbee wrote an important reflection of his 
experiences at the Paris Peace Conference. See 
Toynbee, The World after the Peace Conference.
7. For his wartime reflections on British- 
Ottoman relations, see Toynbee, Turkey. For 
Toynbee’s anti- Ottoman propaganda writings, 
see Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities, and Toynbee, 
The Murderous Tyranny.
8. See Toynbee, Nationality and the War, 
399 – 404. Toynbee’s introduction to the book 
was written in February 1915, at the beginning 
of the war, before the Gallipoli campaigns. It 
does reflect the mood of early declaration of 
jihad by the Ottoman Empire and Indian Mus-
lim public opinion.
9. The change in Toynbee’s attitude toward Tur-
key can be seen in his later writings. See, for ex-
ample, Toynbee, The Western Question.
10. See Overy, The Morbid Age.
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As a well- educated writer familiar with European 
intellectuals, especially Toynbee, Karakoç illus-
trated the importance of the circulation of ideas 
on a global scale.
Toynbee as a Global Intellectual 
Before analyzing Karakoç’s civilizationism, it is 
important to examine the importance of Toynbee 
as a global intellectual whose world history model 
influenced Karakoç tremendously.5 Toynbee was 
educated at Oxford and began teaching at Balliol 
College in 1912. He became a professor of modern 
Greek and Byzantine history at King’s College 
of London upon his graduation. During WWI, 
Toynbee worked for the Political Intelligence 
Department of the British Foreign Office and 
served in the British delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference.6 Toynbee also served as a director of 
research at the Royal Institute for International 
Affairs for thirty years, from 1925 to 1955. During 
WWII, Toynbee again worked for the British 
foreign office and attended the peace talks.
Throughout his active government service, 
Toynbee mobilized his analytical skills for the ser-
vice of British imperial internationalism, and he 
wrote extensively on the politics of the Muslim 
world, the Ottoman Empire, and modern Turkey. 
During WWI, Toynbee did contribute to the anti- 
Ottoman propaganda of the British Empire, and 
while he was doing that, he had to reflect on the 
geopolitics of Islam and the West and the ques-
tion of Pan- Islamism.7 When young Toynbee was 
defending the war efforts of the British Empire 
against the Ottoman call for jihad, the British 
Empire ruled over five times more Muslim popu-
lations than the Ottomans. Thus, he was deeply 
troubled by Indian Muslims’ pro- Ottoman sym-
pathies and post – WWI Indian Khilafat movement 
in support of the Ottoman caliphate, for example, 
and recommended that the British colonial of-
ficers explain to their loyal Muslim subjects the 
true nature of Muslim political theory on both 
the caliphate and the Ottoman Empire.8 Yet, even 
when the British Empire ruled over more Muslims 
than Christians, Toynbee considered it a represen-
tative of Western civilization, while the Ottoman 
Empire ruling over Armenians, Greeks, and Jews 
was considered a representative of the Muslim 
world. Toynbee seemed relieved by the disintegra-
tion of the Ottoman Empire and abolishment of 
the Ottoman Caliphate after WWI, and during 
the interwar years, Toynbee’s relationship with 
Turkey improved as he became supportive of the 
new Turkish Republic and praised its radical west-
ernization program.9 As for the overall direction 
of the future of British international order during 
the interwar period, however, Toynbee put forward 
an analysis that attributed problems of world order 
to a general civilizational crisis about the superior 
virtues of Hellenistic and Christian heritage. He 
was one of the influential aristocratic intellectu-
als of Britain’s “morbid age,” according to Richard 
Overy, convinced of the eventual civilizational de-
cline of the West in relation to ironically western-
izing non- European civilizations.10
Toynbee became an international celebrity 
for his monumental twelve- volume work of com-
parative world history (titled A Study of History, pub-
lished from 1934 to 1965). It was the one- volume 
abridgment of the first ten volumes of Toynbee’s 
A Study of History by D. C. Somervell (in 1957), 
rather than the large multivolume project itself, 
that became an international best seller in mul-
tiple translations. To promote his books, Toynbee 
lectured in almost every major city in the world 
from the 1950s to the mid- 1970s. While the US 
university campuses ranked at the top in terms of 
Toynbee’s public lectures and visiting professor ap-
pointments, Toynbee visited and lectured in vari-
ous Muslim countries to crowded audiences from 
11. For the text of some of his speeches in the 
Middle East and Asia, see Toynbee, The Toyn-
bee Lectures on the Middle East, and Toynbee, 
Four Lectures.
12. For modernization theory and Cold War con-
nections, see Engerman et al., Staging Growth, 
and Gilman, Mandarins of the Future.
13. For a good example of how Toynbee’s ideas 
can be in conversation with Buddhist revival in 
Cold War – era Japan at the peak of its modern-
ization, see Toynbee, Choose Life.
14. For this generation of British imperial inter-
nationalists, see Mazower, No Enchanted Pal-
ace, esp. 66 – 103.
15. For a good summary of Alfred Zimmern’s 
ideas on empire and world order, see ibid.
16. On imperial internationalism see Zimmern, 
The Prospect of Civilization, and Zimmern, Spiri-
tual Values and World Affairs.
17. See Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and 
Pan- Asianism.”
18. For the broader politics of the discourse 
of civilization, see Aydin, The Politics of Anti- 
Westernism in Asia.
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Cairo, Beirut, and Kabul to Tehran, Istanbul, and 
Islamabad.11
Toynbee’s intellectual influence peaked dur-
ing the early Cold War, between 1950 and 1975, 
when, ironically, his main ideas seemed to be 
critical of and contradictory to the mainstream 
modernization theory, in both its US and Soviet 
versions.12 This raises an important question: How 
was Toynbee’s reception in countries where postco-
lonial forms of modernization were very powerful, 
such as Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon, 
and Egypt? In all of these Muslim countries, the 
elites were committed to modernizing and west-
ernizing their countries rather than reviving their 
civilization. Some of Toynbee’s ideas, especially 
those critical of Western materialism, militarism, 
and the viability of its alternatives in other civiliza-
tions, are frequently quoted by intellectuals critical 
of westernization and modernization, especially 
those advocating Islamic, Confucian, or Buddhist 
revival.13
Toynbee’s reproduction of the civilization-
ist reading of world history and world politics also 
seemed contradictory to dominant trends in his-
torical scholarship and geopolitical discourses dur-
ing the postcolonial Cold War period, when ideals 
of modernization and nationalism overshadowed 
the colonial- era discourses of civilizational hierar-
chies and comparisons. Toynbee’s civilizationism 
was always more than a comparative study of world 
cultures, and it had its own political implications 
for the British Empire’s international relations as 
well. Toynbee represents a generation of British 
imperial internationalists who had the chance to 
rethink the moral and philosophical foundations 
of the changing world order from the 1900s to 
the 1970s.14 Given Toynbee’s earlier commitment 
to the ideal of a British commonwealth, his belief 
in the superiority of Hellenistic Christian founda-
tions of modern world order, and his earlier racial- 
geopolitical views about the superiority of the West, 
Toynbee’s internationalism and humanism after 
WWII demonstrate an impressive change of heart 
and mind. Toynbee was highly influenced by his 
Greek history professor, Alfred Zimmern, a found-
ing figure of the future UNESCO, who made an-
cient Greece very relevant for the legitimacy crisis 
of the imperial world order and argued for a Third 
British Empire based on their imagined model 
of the Greek Commonwealth.15 For Zimmern, as 
well as young Toynbee, the new British Empire’s 
rule could be different than Rome’s imperialism. 
By the 1920s, both Zimmern and Toynbee moved 
away from the late nineteenth- century notions of 
white man’s racial superiority. Yet, they continued 
to hold on to a civilizational view of world history 
and international affairs, arguing for a dialogue of 
diverse global civilizations in a decolonizing world 
while keeping their belief in the relative superi-
ority of the West.16 As Prasenjit Duara has noted, 
however, during the interwar period, civilizational 
discourse became a tool of anticolonial national-
ism, empowering claims for equality and national 
liberation rather than justifying British imperial 
rule.17 From Tagore and Okakura Tenshin to Sun 
Yat- Sen and Jawaharlal Nehru, Asian intellectuals 
used the idea of their civilizational heritage and 
greatness to refute the claim of the civilizing mis-
sion of Western colonialism.18 As decolonization 
progressed, the intellectual circles who wanted to 
abandon a civilizational worldview in favor of a de-
velopmentalist one (proto- modernization theory) 
were becoming more vocal.
Cold War Political Implications  
of Toynbee’s Civilizationism
As a British imperial internationalist, Toynbee re-
flected a confident belief in the superiority of Hel-
lenistic and Christian civilization to other existing 
civilizations in his early training and writings. But 
19. For an early example of his relatively posi-
tive assessment of the survival of Islamic civili-
zation despite the hegemony of the West, see 
“Islam, the West, and the Future,” in Toynbee, 
Civilization on Trial, 164 – 87. 
20. See McNeill, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life, chap. 
10.
21. See Trevor- Roper, “Arnold Toynbee’s Millen-
nium.”
22. See Saleh, Trevor- Roper’s Critique of Arnold 
Toynbee.
23. For examples of Toynbee’s translation into 
Turkish, see Toynbee, Dünya ve Garp (The World 
and the West); Toynbee, Tarih Üzerine: İki Kon-
ferans (Civilization on Trial); Toynbee, Tarih Bil-
inci (A Study of History); and Toynbee, Medeni-
yet Yargılanıyor (Civilization on Trial).
24. Trevor- Roper, “Arnold Toynbee’s Millen-
nium,” 18.
25. For a good discussion of this topic, see 
Latham, Modernization as Ideology.
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something changed in this confidence as the Brit-
ish Empire retreated from the peak of its imperial 
hegemony, while Europe and the world witnessed 
two destructive world wars. By the 1950s, Toynbee 
no longer assumed or advocated the superiority 
of Western civilization. In fact, part of his positive 
reputation in Muslim countries derives from the 
fact that, as a Western historian celebrity, Toynbee 
wrote about the negative aspects of Western civili-
zation while saying good things about Islamic civi-
lization and its capacity to survive Western domi-
nation.19 This broader civilizational comparative 
view had its political aspects as well. Toynbee gen-
erally said positive things about postcolonial na-
tionalism in Asia and Africa. When the news of the 
Suez Crisis of 1956 reached Toynbee, for example, 
he was in Japan. He vehemently opposed the Brit-
ish attack on Egypt, which obviously added to his 
prestige in the Arab world. On the trip back home, 
Toynbee visited Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran and 
often expressed his critique of Western imperial-
ism. In Pakistan, he was hosted by then Prime Min-
ister Ayub Khan. During his visit to Mashhad Uni-
versity in Iran, young Ali Shariati was a member 
of the student club that hosted him. Toynbee was 
also critical of Zionism and supportive of Palestin-
ian demands.20 When Hugh Trevor- Roper’s famous 
harsh critique of Toynbee was published in June 
1957, Toynbee was in Beirut.21 In 1958, an Iraqi in-
tellectual, Zaki Saleh, wrote a book in defense of 
Toynbee against Trevor-Roper’s critique.22
Because of Toynbee’s status as a global intel-
lectual, as well as his critique of the West in an era 
of decolonization, his writings on Turkey, Islam, 
and the Middle East were translated into Turk-
ish.23 Toynbee’s model of world civilizations was 
especially welcomed by intellectuals such as Kara-
koç who advocated an Islamic revival as an alter-
native to both socialism and capitalism. Toynbee’s 
critique of the US and Soviet models of modern-
ization during the Cold War, as products of ma-
terialist and destructive Western Christian civili-
zation, was especially encouraging for Karokoç’s 
vision of reviving Islamic civilization as a cure to 
the crisis of the modern world. Beyond that, this 
association of modernity with Western civilization 
tied all the dark sides of modern times (colonial-
ism, destructive wars, and the corruption of third 
world political elites) to Western hegemony. In 
fact, the antimodernist implication of Toynbee’s 
critique of Western civilization was well under-
stood by Western commentators. Trevor- Roper 
wrote: “At the foundation of Toynbee’s version 
of the present crisis of the West was a profound 
anti- modernism — a rejection of the contemporary 
secular decadence and a call for a neo- medieval 
flight from this world. Karl Popper spoke for many 
critics when he disparaged this view as ‘apocalyptic 
irrationalism.’ ”24 According to the Islamist readers 
of Toynbee, one could escape from the decadence 
of the secular modernism of the contemporary 
West to the utopian vision of Islamic civilization. 
Their imagined solution to the problems of the 
modern world was to return to or to resurrect Is-
lamic civilization, the proposed alternative to the 
West. In this way, Islamist intellectuals embraced 
Toynbee’s civilizationism as evidence in their cri-
tiques of modernization theory of both the Ameri-
can and Soviet varieties.
Civilizational thinking in world politics was 
not a preferred ideology promoted by the United 
States or the Soviet Union, the superpowers of the 
Cold War period. This way of thinking was asso-
ciated with old forms of empire before the Sec-
ond World War, as imperial rule had to be based 
on the legitimacy of the civilizing mission. Both 
superpowers of the Cold War competition had 
to deal with the reality of the postimperial and 
nation- state- based world, as well as the agency of 
new nationalist elites. They offered, instead, a path 
of modernization that is open to any and every cul-
ture of the world, irrespective of their religious 
and civilizational background.25 In this context, 
however, the US version of liberal modernization 
26. For Zimmern’s positive view of America as 
the leader of the Western civilization, see Zim-
mern, American Road to World Peace. Toynbee 
was featured on the cover of the influential 
Time magazine on March 17, 1947, with a cap-
tion reading, “Our civilization is not inevitably 
doomed.” The United States was the country 
in which Arnold Toynbee visited and lectured 
most.
27. For the usage of civilizationism in anticolo-
nial discourses, see Hay, Asian Ideas of East and 
West, and Aydin, “Beyond Civilization.”
28. For an influential book that depicts all west-
ernization and modernization movements in 
the late Ottoman and Republican periods in 
Turkey as alienation from one’s native civiliza-
tion, see Doğan, Batılılaşma İhaneti.
31 5Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç
was able to reproduce civilizational dichotomy in 
new anthropological terminology by positing es-
sential cultures of the East, West, Asia, or Islam. 
Thus, it should not be surprising that both Zim-
mern and Toynbee found a receptive audience in 
Cold War America, where modernization theory 
became a master narrative in the social sciences.26 
One should not assume irreconcilable contradic-
tions between US modernization theory and the 
British imperial internationalist civilizational 
worldview. While the new national leaders of the 
postcolonial world were struggling with issues of 
economic underdevelopment and developmental 
gap, culture and civilizational talk continued its 
appeal to both American and European intellec-
tuals as well as to the educated elites of Asia and 
Africa. Thus, Toynbee’s writings on the history 
of world civilizations, their encounter, and their 
future viability did not seem completely obsolete, 
although there were clear tensions between this 
civilizational view and modernization theory. This 
tension was most obvious to socialists and to the 
Left, who expressed their objections to Toynbee’s 
civilizationism, which they found antimodernist.
Both in the Muslim and non- Muslim intel-
lectual circles of Asia and Africa, Toynbee did 
appeal to those who attempted to overcome Euro-
centrism in world history perceptions. But in this 
context, Toynbee was just confirming what was al-
ready known and accepted. Civilizationism was a 
dominant anticolonial discourse in Pan- Islamism, 
Pan- Africanism, and Pan- Asianism, whereby na-
tionalists, ranging from Tagore and Ghandi to 
Sun Yat- Sen and Mehmet Akif Ersoy, already chal-
lenged the idea of Western civilization’s supremacy 
by characterizing it as decadent, declined, and vio-
lent. Moreover, they depicted Islamic, Indian, Chi-
nese, African, and Asian civilizations as spiritual 
and moral alternatives.27 With Toynbee, we see a 
prominent British internationalist confirming, in 
a new historical language, what anticolonial intel-
lectuals have already been arguing for a century.
Civilizational paradigms were especially en-
trenched in Muslim intellectual discourses, and 
on a popular level, Toynbee struck a chord with 
Islamist internationalists in their belief in the 
continued survival and future resurrection of Is-
lamic civilization against Western civilization. But, 
in these civilizational interpretations, Toynbee’s 
model made the modernization and westerniza-
tion of Muslim societies seem like a cultural be-
trayal by relegating global modernity to an exten-
sion of Western civilization. Thus, a Toynbean 
model of world history would imply a critique of 
Kemalist westernization attempts in Turkey, as 
Eurocentric modernization would mean leaving 
behind the legacy of Muslim civilization in favor 
of an alien and rival Western civilization, which 
had many problems. Throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century, Muslim reformist elites 
tried to strengthen their societies and political 
structures to be more in tune with the paradigm of 
multiple modernities than the paradigm of West-
ern modernity. Many did not see selective and cre-
ative adoptions from Europe as an insult to their 
religious and cultural heritage. 
Thus, Toynbee’s main arguments about the 
incompatibility among encountering world civi-
lizations must have seemed disorienting and pa-
tronizing, especially given that almost all the de-
colonized Muslim nations were undergoing rapid 
modernization projects during the 1950s and the 
1960s. Yet, oppositional intellectuals who were 
critical of top- down state modernization projects 
or the downsides of modernization projects could 
find Toynbee’s framework of analysis useful and 
empowering. According to an Islamist interpreta-
tion of the Toynbean civilizational model, Ataturk, 
Abd an- Nasser, and Reza Shah would all look like 
culturally alienated traitors, and in fact, the asser-
tive Islamism of the 1970s and the 1980s made that 
argument forcefully.28
29. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 117.
30. See Karakoç, Düşünceler I, 9 – 10.
31. Ibid., 10.
32. See Karakoç, İnsanlığın Dirilişi, 10.
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Civilizationist Internationalism  
in Sezai Karakoç’s Islamism
Karakoç’s depiction of Islam as a civilizational al-
ternative to the West was strikingly similar to Toyn-
bee’s model of historical encounter among civiliza-
tions. Even though Karakoç read and often quoted 
Toynbee, it is less likely that he owes all of his ideas 
to Toynbee exclusively. As mentioned earlier, civili-
zationism already existed in late Ottoman thought 
as well as in broader anticolonial third world na-
tionalism. Karakoç has presented a version of Is-
lamism around the notion of “the resurrection of 
Islamic civilization,” which is regarded as superior 
to the Western ideologies of capitalism and com-
munism. By proposing the idea of resurrection 
(diriliş), Karakoç develops a method of perceiv-
ing Islam as a totality from a historical and civi-
lizational perspective. Seen from this perspective, 
Islam is a worldview, a manner of life and civiliza-
tion with a particular view of state, society, culture, 
and economics. 
In this view of Islamic civilization, Karakoç 
relies on but also departs from Toynbee: Karakoç 
was initially a third worldist internationalist, cel-
ebrating the awakening of the non- Western world 
and hoping that this process would ultimately end 
the global political hegemony of the West. Accord-
ing to Karakoç’s utopian alternative teleology, the 
decolonizing trends will culminate in the revival 
of the dignity of the Muslim world and the East, 
possibly giving birth to a new federation of Mus-
lim states in the Middle East. Karakoç perceives 
this resurrection almost as revenge on the West, 
a sentiment that Toynbee would not share. More-
over, for Karakoç, Islamic civilization is the main 
alternative to the West, while for Toynbee, Indian, 
Chinese, and Japanese civilizations have their own 
merits and advantages, and no single civilization 
should necessarily dominate world politics after 
the decline of the West.
Karakoç perceives the history of humanity as 
the encounter and interaction of different civiliza-
tions, including Islamic and Western civilizations. 
It is important to note that this is not a conflict 
between the religious traditions and faiths of Islam 
and Christianity. Karakoç was not a theologian, 
and he never advocated a revival of religiosity that 
we see in Pakistan’s Jamaat- i Islami or Egypt’s Mus-
lim Brotherhood organizations.
Karakoç’s view that the idea of civilization is 
not peculiar to the West or Islam but is a feature of 
the history of human beings, and there have been 
multiple civilizations in world history, is very simi-
lar to a Toynbean view of civilization. Yet, Karakoç 
takes it a step further and merges the notion of rev-
elation in monotheistic religions with his vision of 
supranational civilizations. For him, there is an un-
changing essential humanity, which people of the 
world could remember one day though they have 
forgotten: the civilization of truth or revelation.29 
Once he situated divine knowledge as the basis 
of his vision of ideal civilization, Karakoç could 
avoid civilizational relativism in comparing one 
civilization to another. For him, there emerged 
an ideal civilization, namely Islamic civilization, 
which is most harmonious with revealed wisdom 
from God. Accordingly, Karakoç’s definition of 
civilization differs from the famous late Ottoman 
social theorist Ziya Gökalp’s view that a civiliza-
tion is the sum total of common works created by 
a group of nations. Karakoç finds this description 
an over- objectification and materialization, which 
naturally makes industrialized Western civilization 
superior to all others.30 Instead, Karakoç gives a re-
ligiously based definition of civilization: “Human 
being[s] can exist only with God. From this point 
of view, the ideal and goal of [a] human being is 
divine in origin. This goal is to become a creature 
according to God’s wishes.”31 
History is conceived by Karakoç as the story 
of the rise, decline, and resurrection of civiliza-
tions. In his view, the old, “declined” civilizations 
are the history of the human soul and should not 
be put aside. Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Greek, 
Roman, Islamic, and post- Renaissance Western 
civilizations evidence the self- realization of hu-
manity throughout history.32 In the flow of these 
multiple civilizations, Karakoç delineates two lines 
that clash with each other. At this point, his civili-
zational reading of history is expressed in the form 
33. Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 59 – 60. 
34. See ibid.
35. Karakoç, Sütun, 67.
36. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 
236 – 37.
37. See Toynbee, A Study of History.
38. For the history of the clash of the civilization 
thesis, see Aydin, Politics of Anti- Westernism in 
Asia, and Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution.
39. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 83, and Kara-
koç, İnsanlığın Dirilişi, 7 – 10.
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of dichotomies: “Two civilizations have clashed 
with each other since the very beginning of hu-
manity: civilization of good and civilization of evil, 
civilization of white and civilization of black . . . 
civilization of prophets and civilization of devils, 
eastern civilization and western civilization.”33 In 
these dichotomies, the term East is equal to Islamic 
civilization, while the birthplace of the “true” civi-
lization is today’s Middle East. It is important to 
underline that, at the peak of Cold War conflicts, 
Karakoç still perceived an ongoing confrontation 
between European/Western civilization, as the 
representative of evil, and Islamic/Eastern civiliza-
tion, as the representative of good.34
We see Karakoç’s adoption of Toynbee’s idea 
of multiple surviving civilizations in his critique 
of the Kemalist notion of civilization. Kemalism 
as the official ideology of the Turkish nation- 
state postulated that all civilizations other than 
the superior Western civilization are doomed to 
fade away. In his writings on the idea of civiliza-
tion, Karakoç denies the positivist belief of Kemal-
ist ideology of Turkish nationalism that there has 
been only one global civilization, namely Western 
civilization, because of its hegemonic position in 
modern history, science, and technology. In re-
sponse, Karakoç argues that Islamic civilization 
will not disappear in the face of the detrimental 
effects of modern Western civilization, though the 
destructive effects of the West over other civiliza-
tions are definite. But, he writes, “The West could 
not kill the Islamic civilization. Islamic civilization, 
by taking a lesson from this life and death clash 
with the Western culture, is reviving as the most 
original civilization.”35 As we see with Karakoç’s 
use of Toynbee’s model to critique Kemalist no-
tions of civilization, ideas in one British imperial 
internationalist context can take on new meanings 
in a different context, extending beyond the inten-
tions of the original author.
Karakoç’s understanding of the laws of his-
tory is different than Toynbee’s analysis of the 
rise and fall of civilizations. Karakoç argues that 
Toynbee exaggerated the relation between states 
and civilizations. Civilization cannot be confined 
to the life of some particular states and nations. 
Karakoç makes a distinction between two concepts 
of civilization: the first speaks to and involves hu-
manity as a whole; the second concerns specific, 
concrete civilizations in history. Karakoç’s insis-
tence on the humanism and internationalism of a 
particular civilization illustrates his antinational-
ist concerns. For him, concrete civilizations like Is-
lamic and Western civilizations belong to human-
ity, not to a nation.36 
In A Study of History, Toynbee referred to 
civilizations as isolated spheres that can be under-
stood in and of themselves, without reference to 
other areas of the world — spheres where the links 
in a causal sequence are contained within their 
own time and space.37 But in Karakoç’s formula-
tion, civilizations are political units as well. We can 
perhaps see clear contradictions between Toyn-
bee’s vision of postimperial British international-
ism and Karakoç’s anticolonial Muslim interna-
tionalism. Despite Karakoç’s rejection of European 
and American hegemony in world politics, his eval-
uation of the achievements of Western civilization 
could be positive on many occasions. For him, the 
reality of an encounter between civilizations may 
result in some kind of Hegelian synthesis, a com-
bination of the characteristics of each civilization. 
But he also speaks of the clash between Islam and 
the West, which is an extreme form of encounter 
between civilizations.38 In Karakoç’s intellectual 
vision, technology is regarded as something to be 
used for recognizing the positive differences of 
societies and even for preserving them. After all, 
technology can strengthen trends toward resem-
blance, unification, or friendship of societies. This 
positive statement is accompanied by Karakoç’s 
strong emphasis that, like the materialist positivist 
understanding of science, technology is not able 
to bring a new meaning or a new civilization to 
humanity.39 Technology seems to be confirming 
Karakoç’s vision of shared humanity and inter-
40. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham II, 46 – 51.
41. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 133.
42. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 38 – 39.
43. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 87, and Karakoç, 
Çağ ve İlham I, 24.
44. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 26.
45. See ibid., 28, 88 – 89.
46. See ibid., 26 – 28, and Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham 
I, 85.
47. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 
161 – 62.
48. See Karakoç, Fizik Ötesi Açısından Ufuklar ve 
Daha Ötesi I, 139.
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nationalism as he speaks of the softening effect 
of technology over the distinction between East 
and West. The advances in technology have eradi-
cated the walls between the East and the West, 
first against Eastern civilizations but today against 
Western civilization. By learning the achievements 
of old civilizations, Europeans have lost their be-
lief that Europe is the only, absolute civilization 
on earth. Indeed, Karokoç finds in technological 
globalization the roots of the idea of world civili-
zation, which had been the ideal of the prophets 
from the beginning of humanity.40
Resurrection (Diriliş) of Islamic Civilization
Resurrection is a central concept to Karakoç’s 
thought, and his analyses of politics, history, and 
philosophy are closely tied to this ideal. In his writ-
ings on diriliş, we can see the legacy of anti – social 
Darwinist arguments of late Ottoman era Muslim 
intellectuals. At the peak of Western imperial hege-
mony, many European intellectuals and Oriental-
ists maintained the notion that Islamic civilization 
had declined permanently, with no hope of revival. 
The European public’s view of the Ottoman Em-
pire as a “sick man” paralleled the harsh judgment 
about the impossibility of Muslim reform and re-
newal that appeared in the writings and speeches 
of figures such as Ernest Renan and Lord Cromer. 
In response, Muslim intellectuals conceded their 
relative backwardness but insisted that their de-
cline was temporary and that Muslims had the 
historical potential to reawaken and revive. Kara-
koç reiterates this theme in Muslim modernism 
with an exaggerated emphasis: “Birth and death 
are two faces of the life but resurrection, which is 
born of the togetherness of birth and death, is the 
real life. If we say in a Hegelian dialectic, birth is 
thesis, death is antithesis and resurrection is syn-
thesis.”41 Then, Karakoç elaborated extensively on 
how Muslims were able to revive their civilization 
despite the East’s imitative Westernist reforms. Ac-
cording to Karakoç, westernization movements of 
Eastern intellectuals who feel inferior to the West 
(like Kemalists) are products of Western attempts 
to prevent the resurrection of Islamic civilization.42
Karakoç argues that the central issue for con-
temporary Muslims is the resurrection of Islam, 
an objective that begins with the purification of 
Muslims. When Muslims get rid of their “verbal 
muslimness” and become “real Muslim[s] in their 
souls,” they will reach the resurrection by embrac-
ing the goodness, beauty, and truth of both the 
East and the West.43 The resurrection of Islam 
means the resurrection of humanity or resurrec-
tion of the “truth civilization.”44 This is the revival 
of real humanism, or divine humanism, that will 
save humanity from capitalism. This revived Islam 
is then presented as an alternative to both capital-
ism and communism. Karakoç also reflects on de-
tails such as the right to own property; unlike the 
capitalist idolization of, and the communist antag-
onism toward, property, Islam will institutionalize 
it as a duty and responsibility, a tool for the per-
fection of society and humanity.45 He argues that 
Western ideologies of communism, capitalism, fas-
cism, and Nazism are masks that cover the truth 
under the claim of universality.46
Karakoç often talks about a crisis of Islamic 
civilization, which for him has emerged with the 
impact of Western civilization in Muslim lands. 
He perceives the encounter between Islam and 
the West as the last major civilizational encounter, 
which results in the war waged by Western colo-
nialism against Muslims. Karakoç believes that 
Islamic civilization will triumph over the West, 
though the Islamic world has been wounded seri-
ously by the West’s political power. In the ultimate 
stage, Islam will revive the civilization of humanity 
and consequently will give an end to the cruelty 
and barbarism of the West.47 Karakoç is not against 
intercivilizational learning, as he urges Muslims 
to be prepared to engage productively with other 
civilizations, enriching themselves through civili-
zational encounters, conflicts, and challenges.48 
49. See, for example, Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: 
Sur, 29 – 30, and Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham IV, 23 – 29.
50. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 43.
51. Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 213 – 14.
52. For details see Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham IV, 
92 – 93; Karakoç, Yapı Taşları ve Kaderimizin 
Çağrısı I, 204 – 5; and Karakoç, Yapı Taşları ve 
Kaderimizin Çağrısı II, 163 – 64, 200.
53. See Karakoç, Fizikötesi Açısından Ufuklar ve 
Daha Ötesi I, 75 – 80, and Karakoç, Tarihin Yol 
Ağzında, 25.
54. See, for instance, Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham II, 
96 – 97; Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 
50 – 51; and Karakoç, Sütun, 345.
55. See Karakoç, Dirilişin Çevresinde, 191.
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On the other hand, Karakoç’s writings are full of 
passages trying to justify the superiority of Islam 
over other civilizations.49 One major reason for this 
superiority, for him, is Islamic civilization’s mono-
theistic roots, which are not similar to those of 
Buddhism of the East.50
According to Karakoç, writing during the 
rivalries of the Cold War, the hope of humanity 
for a renaissance lies in the resurrection of Islamic 
civilization, not to the West, which has polluted 
nature and has been caught in the grips of false 
humanism. This is the revenge of Islam but not 
a crude vengeance, even though the West, under 
different names and under different periods, has 
often crusaded against Islam.51 The resurrection of 
Islam places the duty of developing a new model 
of state, culture, and country on the shoulders of 
Islamic countries. It is not possible to continue 
with the invented borders of the existing states in 
Muslim lands. The small nation- states of the cur-
rent Muslim world, which are created by Europe-
ans, cannot be regarded as states in real terms. In 
the near past, the only state in the Middle East was 
the Ottoman state. Following this line of think-
ing, Karakoç calls for the establishment of three 
Islamic federations: an Eastern Islamic Federation 
in Eastern Asia, a Middle Islamic Federation in the 
Middle East, and a Western Islamic Federation in 
Africa. Eventually these three federations will be 
part of the Great Federation of Islam.52
Karakoç does not accept the argument that 
the Ottoman state declined while the West was on 
the rise. According to him, the Islamic world and 
the Ottoman state did not decline but progressed 
at a slow pace. However, Europe has taken great 
steps in material and technical fields at particular 
moments such as the Renaissance and the Indus-
trial Revolution. There was no decline in absolute 
terms. It is meaningless to divide Ottoman history 
into three periods of rise, stagnation, and decline. 
The Ottoman state had been in progress from its 
beginning to the early nineteenth century. Even 
societal life in the Ottoman state was very civilized 
until just before its end. Karakoç argues, by quot-
ing Toynbee, that Ottoman civilization was not a 
dead civilization but an interrupted one, as a result 
of the intervention of external powers.53
The reemergence of civilization conscious-
ness among Islamists is directly related to disil-
lusionment with the westernization movement. 
As such, Karakoç describes the Ottoman- Turkish 
modernization movement as a process of alien-
ation of the East from its own civilization. There 
is a clear amnesia on the part of Karakoç about 
the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire, 
which, until 1878, constituted almost 40 percent of 
the Ottoman population. Moreover, the Ottoman 
Empire ruled over Southeastern Europe. There is 
no mention of this Ottoman cosmopolitanism in 
Karakoç’s writings. He only talks about the Otto-
man Empire as a Muslim empire, representing the 
Islamic civilization and the East. This erasure of 
the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish populations of 
the geographies of the Ottoman Empire and Turk-
ish Republic in narratives of civilizational history 
is true of other Islamist thinkers as well as the ma-
jority of secular nationalists throughout the Cold 
War.  
The Westernist attempt at the civilizational 
conversion of Turkey from the Islamic civiliza-
tion to the Western one is vehemently rejected by 
Karakoç on the grounds that civilization cannot 
be imitated. Westernization is the loss of one’s 
own civilization in the name of acquiring another 
civilization.54 It is in these sentiments and inter-
pretations where one can clearly see the impact 
of Toynbee’s world historical model on Karakoç. 
According to this interpretation, the westerniza-
tion reforms from the Ottoman Tanzimat to Re-
publican Turkey have been seen as a failure.55 The 
Westernist intellectual who desires to be a part of 
the West is humiliated by his admiration of the 
West. In Karakoç’s eyes, these intellectuals are the 
casualties of the war between Islam and the West.56 
57. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 24, and Karakoç, 
İslamın Dirilişi, 23.
58. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 81.
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What the Islamic world needs for the resurrection 
of Islamic civilization and the salvage of humanity 
is the emergence of a Muslim intellectual who rep-
resents Islamic virtue and morality.57
Karakoç’s Essentialism
The very identity of Western civilization in Kara-
koç’s eyes is intimately bound up with its self- 
righteous sense of superiority and exploitation of 
humanity, beginning with its Greco- Roman heri-
tage and extending through the Renaissance to 
the modern West. By the term West, Karakoç refers 
mainly to Europe, not the United States, which for 
him is a derivate culture that could never depart 
from the destiny of Europe.58 Modern European 
civilization is predicated on power and the exploi-
tation of peoples in several parts of the world, and 
thus, Karakoç constructs a negative correlation be-
tween the supremacy of Europe and the resurrec-
tion of humanity: “Whenever Europe resurrects, 
humanity suffers pains and whenever there is an 
internal conflict within the West, humanity takes 
a breath.”59 His anti- European rhetoric includes 
strong anticolonialist connotations: “By the words 
‘human being’ in the documents that have been 
promulgated out of the French Revolution, the 
Russian revolution, and the movement of United 
Nations, Europeans intend just themselves; in fact, 
they do not accept non- Europeans as human.”60 
According to Karakoç’s historical account, the 
West is not able to escape from the Roman sense of 
superiority. Westerners/Romans are free citizens 
and masters; the rest are slaves. Karakoç added 
that Christianity, despite its monotheistic moral 
teachings, could not kill this Roman spirit in the 
hearts of the Westerners.61
One major point that is central to Karakoç’s 
criticism of the West resonates with the critique 
made by the Islamists during the late Ottoman 
period. They depicted the West in terms of eco-
nomic and military power and materialism. For Is-
lamists, the problems of colonialism and exploita-
tion are not features of Islamic civilization but are 
inevitable features of the corrupt Western civiliza-
tion. At one level, the Islamist conceptualization 
of the West is similar to the Western Orientalist 
depictions of the imagined Muslim world, as they 
both believed in the essential difference between 
the civilizations of the religiously oriented tradi-
tional Orient and the materially superior modern 
Occident. 
The Western man is characterized by Kara-
koç, above all, by commitment to nature, reason, 
senses, objects, and this world: “[The] outward- 
looking human see[s] himself as a force of nature. 
Like it, he is destructive, shocking, striking and 
even brutal. . . . Power is the right, or at least, right 
is nothing without material power. Reality means ac-
tivism. This activism sometimes reaches . . . the level 
of aggression, but this situation does not hurt the 
feelings of the Western man. The end is important 
for him. Shock, movement, change are the practical 
outcomes of the [W]estern attitude.”62 The Eastern 
attitude is depicted by Karakoç as inward looking 
and reluctant toward nature, full of passivism and 
peace. As the middle way, Karakoç argues, the Is-
lamic attitude is not a synthesis or combination of 
these two attitudes. It is activist but does not regard 
aggression as the principle of life. Karakoç’s ideal 
Muslims love peace but still regard war and peace 
as the necessary conditions for the existence of the 
divine order. Domination over nature by Karakoç’s 
idealized Muslims is to be realized not for shocking 
humanity but for purifying it.63
Karakoç respects Christianity’s spiritualism 
but does not think that it can save the West from 
materialism and greed. Religion in the modern 
West cannot be a source of civilizational resurrec-
tion.64 European Christians are far from the es-
sence of their religion and many of their intellec-
tuals — like Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Martin 
Heidegger, Jean- Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Bert-
nard Russell, Sigmund Freud, Auguste Comte, and 
André Gide — are against Christianity. Western im-
perialism has nothing to do with the Christian love 
of human beings. The church in the West, accord-
65. Karakoç, Dirilişin Çevresinde, 130 – 32.
66. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 83; Karakoç, 
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ing to Karakoç, is nothing more than a justifica-
tion for committing sin. It continues to legitimize 
antireligious worldly changes in accordance with 
the commands of capitalism, while opposing the 
truth.65
Partly in contradiction to his general nega-
tive Islamist discourse on the rise of the West, 
Karakoç comes to underline the contributions of 
Islamic civilization to the formation of the West’s 
material supremacy. Although he reiterates the 
fact that Greek civilization was passed on to the 
Renaissance by Muslim scholars, unlike the Is-
lamists of the late Ottoman period, he does not see 
this as confirmation of the commonality between 
the modern West and Islamic civilization. The 
West appropriated some ideas and methods from 
Andalusian Islamic civilization that were superior 
to Europe of the Middle Ages from the eleventh to 
fifteenth centuries. But this learning was limited 
to the appropriation of science. For Karakoç, the 
West could not penetrate the soul of Islamic civi-
lization. Moreover, Europe could not admit that it 
had learned from Islam. Europe has established 
a civilization of objects, a high level of material 
achievement, by a materialist inspiration but has 
caused decline in humanity in terms of spirit and 
morality. Even the Renaissance was Christianity’s 
call for help from the ancient Western civilization 
against Islam. In other words, Christianity, the soul 
of the Middle Ages, asked assistance from antiq-
uity to defend itself against Islam, the soul of the 
new age.66 In an attempt to explain the reasons 
for both the decline of Islam and the rise of the 
West, Karakoç provides us with a rather interest-
ing argument. Europeans have appropriated the 
historical, geographical, technological, and com-
mercial knowledge and experience produced by 
Muslims in order to develop industrialization and 
to establish their domination over the world. But 
why did Europeans succeed in areas where Mus-
lims failed? Karakoç argues that Muslims benefit-
ted from the same heritage but did not need to 
make geographical discoveries because they were 
rich and civilized.67
Karakoç’s discourse on civilization entails 
an anticolonialist element that was not so appar-
ent in other Islamists of the period such as Necip 
Fazıl Kısakürek and Nurettin Topçu. Karakoç’s call 
for the establishment of the great Middle Eastern 
State (ortadoğu devleti), which could be realized if 
Western colonialism over the Muslim lands was de-
feated, was highly internationalist in Cold War Tur-
key. Karakoç noted that the anticolonial struggles 
must not utilize Western ideologies if they need 
to truly decolonize themselves. Racism, socialism, 
and humanism are produced by the West itself 
to meet and control the opposition coming from 
non- European countries. For non- Europeans, to 
oppose the West by the means of Western coun-
terarguments, such as Marxism and socialism, is 
another way of westernization.68 In his analysis of 
contemporary ideologies, which are different faces 
of the West, he regards the resistance of fascism 
to capitalism and communism as a negative one, 
which delayed the real resistance of humanity.69 
Expectedly, Karakoç has expressed several times 
his opinion that Turkey’s membership in the Eu-
ropean Union is unacceptable only because of the 
essential difference between Islamic civilization 
and the West.70
Karakoç’s Islamist response to Western su-
premacy is not a call for a retreat into the moun-
tains of Anatolia or into tradition and customs. As 
we see in his book of poetry, Tale (Masal), Karakoç 
describes a father whose seven sons have gone to the 
West. Six of them lost their identities by falling for 
the attractiveness of this civilization, and the last, 
seventh son, who has refused to be changed and to 
be converted, buried himself in a square of a West-
ern city.71 This metaphor is partly his recognition of 
the fact that there is no escape from the colonial 
European experience and the only solution is to 
face the challenge of the West by resisting its attrac-
tiveness without being changed. The only point of 
72. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 146 – 47.
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convergence between the West and Islam, for him, 
is the idea of Mediterranean civilization. The Medi-
terranean is a place where major civilizations meet 
and have a dialogue. Yet, he believes that, unfortu-
nately, Europe has rejected this Mediterranean op-
tion. Thus, in Karakoç’s view, the attempt of saving 
humanity and civilization could be realized only by 
Muslims, not by the arrogant Europeans, around 
the idea of Mediterranean civilization.72
A Critique of the Islamist Discourse on Civilization
Sezai Karakoç’s essentialism of the West or his 
discourse on a pure Islamic civilization does not 
represent a continuity from late Ottoman era Pan- 
Islamism. Instead, it represents a search for an 
alternative beyond the Kemalist monocultural na-
tionalism and Eurocentric modernity during the 
Cold War – era westernization of Turkey.
Karakoç’s Islamist civilizationism shows 
the complicity of Muslim intellectuals in the per-
sistence and survival of Islam- West essentialism 
through the periods of decolonization and the 
Cold War. Islamist internationalism was so depen-
dent on the late nineteenth- century civilizationist 
narrative of Islam versus the West that even after 
a century of international transformation that sig-
naled the end of empires and rise of a nation- state 
world order, Islamism continued to rely on older 
frameworks of Islam and the West, giving new en-
ergy and life to its political appeal. Karakoç does 
not find nationalism and the nation- state forma-
tion sufficient for getting Muslim societies out of 
their colonial “humiliation.” He asks for both de-
westernizatinon and civilizational revival to com-
plete this decolonization process. 
Like the civilizational discourse of Orien-
talism and Eurocentric narratives of supremacy, 
Islamist discourse rests on the basic conviction 
that Islamic civilization is ontologically and epis-
temologically different from the West. It is clear 
that Islamist writers, in their understanding of the 
West, have been caught by the same essentialist 
logic present in the Orientalist tradition. Recently, 
there have been important scholarly attempts to 
overcome the almost two- centuries- long domina-
tion of civilizational discourses in the social sci-
ences, humanities, history, and contemporary 
identity discourses. Similar historical reflections 
are gradually influencing the new cosmopolitan 
generations in Turkey and other Muslim societies 
as well. There are fresh attempts to rewrite world 
history as connected and entangled narratives. 
This new historical narrative is especially impor-
tant for the pro – European Union public opinion 
in Turkey, which has to overcome the civilizational 
narratives of Islam versus the West. However, the 
legacy of centuries- long essentialist thinking, as 
seen in the writings of Toynbee and Karakoç, also 
coexist, often in tension with the actual lived ex-
periences of Turkish and European societies and 
in contradiction of scholarly historical analysis. An 
intellectual project of civilizationist essentialism, 
produced first to justify Eurocentric colonial order 
and then to challenge it, did not fade away and be 
replaced by a view of national or global narratives 
of world cultures. On the contrary, it got further re-
ified and revived during the Cold War era, and by 
new means such as Toynbee’s world history frame-
work and Islamists writers such as Karakoç. The 
post – September 11 era revival of the clash of civi-
lization theories and Islamophobia, as well as the 
new Pan- Islamic identity of Muslim intellectuals in 
the “alliance of civilizations” project, still relies on 
the conceptual heritage left by Cold War thinkers 
such as Toynbee and Karakoç. It is time to reflect 
on and overcome this essentialist discourse.
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